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1 Introduction
The trade talks launched at the WTO’s fourth
ministerial meeting at Doha in November 2001 are
supposed to have at their heart the needs and
interests of developing countries, which are far
more active in the World Trade Organization
(WTO) than they were in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Yet, while some
concessions are going to have to be made to
developing country demands in order to reach a
conclusion to the Doha Round, they are going to be
hard won. So far the industrialised countries have
not been prepared to set aside what they see as
their commercial or political interests to make the
Doha promises a reality.
As part of the focus on development, special and
differential treatment (SDT) was one of three key
issues put on the table for early resolution by the
Doha ministerial conference. In previous trade
rounds, the countries most effective at getting this
kind of special treatment in theWTO have been the
most powerful. Before the Uruguay Round, the
United States of America (USA) and, later, the
European Union (EU) managed to exclude their
agricultural support systems from serious GATT
discipline, and during it they negotiated substantial
exemptions. This amounted to special treatment for
politically powerful large farmers and agribusiness.
They have managed to protect vulnerable industries
such as textiles manufacturers during extended
adjustment periods, and have been prolific users of
the instruments that allow for short-term
protection, such as the anti-dumping agreement.
This special treatment has largely been at the
expense of developing country producers, who
have suffered from low prices, barriers to exports
and dumping in their domestic markets as a result.
Developing countries argue that what they want is
a “rebalancing” of agreements that are weighted
against them, and that their special economic
circumstances mean that instead WTO agreements
should be biased in their favour. Their initial
position, not surprisingly, is to ask for what all
countries want – maximum flexibility for their own
actions, with other countries bound to provide an
open and stable trading environment, and
assistance with the more difficult or costly parts of
the trade policy agenda. The question for the
negotiations is how far developing countriesIDS Bulletin Vol 34 No 2 2003
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should be treated more favourably, and what price
they will pay for these privileges.
This article discusses the manoeuvrings that have
gone on in the WTO since the launch of the Doha
Round as industrialised countries have tried to
manipulate the SDT agenda to ensure that
developing countries pay the highest possible price
for whatever is finally agreed. Developing countries
are faced with a situation where, if they want early
decisions on changes to SDT, they will have to
agree provisions that are either very weak or apply
to only a small number of the poorest countries. If
they hold out for what they consider to be more
meaningful provisions, this will involve protracted
negotiations and run the risk that the price to be
paid in concessions in other areas will be so high
that the potential benefits of reformed SDT would
be negated.
Though slow, and more concerned with issues of
procedure than substance, the negotiations on SDT
since Doha have revealed some of the issues and
principles that may inform the SDT debate in the
future, as it moves towards a discussion of the
content of an agreement, and these are assessed in
the second part of the article.
2 Background: special and
differential treatment before Doha
The idea that developing countries should be treated
differently is not in dispute. Since the 1979 “enabling
clause” there have always been some elements of
GATT and, later, WTO agreements that apply only to
developing countries. SDT is the collective term used
for the provisions scattered about the Uruguay
Round agreements, which make special dispensation
for developing countries. In general, industrialised
countries have very few, if any, binding obligations
towards developing countries, but developing
countries have a number of exemptions from
agreements – either longer periods to implement or
less onerous commitments.1
2.1 Non-mandatory special and
differential treatment
n Various phrases are to be found in a range of
WTO agreements calling on industrialised
countries to pay special attention to the needs
of developing countries, and asserting that the
purpose of trade is to contribute to sustainable
development.
n There are also appeals to industrialised
countries to provide technical assistance to
developing countries, though the amount or
type is not specified.
n The 1979 “enabling clause” allows WTO
members to grant more favourable market
access to developing (and to least developed)
countries than they do to developed countries.
2.2 Mandatory special and differential
treatment
n Developing and least developed countries are
allowed longer periods than developed
countries to implement various WTO
agreements, either automatically or on request.
n Several agreements allow developing and least
developed countries lower commitments than
developed countries to reduce tariffs, subsidies
and other trade distortions.
Utilisation of SDT by developing and developed
countries has been patchy.
n Developed countries. A number of developed
countries have preferential market access
arrangements for developing countries.
However, these often exclude particularly
politically sensitive products that may be those
where developing countries are most able to
compete. Despite the intention to pay special
attention to the needs of developing countries,
industrialised countries have not done as much
as they could to improve the trading
environment for developing country producers.
They have been accused of back loading tariff
reductions on textiles and clothing, continued
tariff escalation and unfair use of anti-dumping
measures. Many developing countries also
argue that much technical assistance is
inadequate for the demands made of them, and
delivered in ways that reduce its effectiveness.
n Developing countries. Most have taken advantage
of the automatic delays in implementation. A
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number of countries have sought to go further
by using WTO provisions that allow them to
request further delays in implementation. But
the response of the developed countries has
underlined the limitations of such contingent
flexibility. They have frequently insisted on
protracted negotiations. Such negotiations for
delays in implementing the agreements on
intellectual property and trade-related
investment measures became highly politicised,
with industrialised countries seeking to extract
maximum political capital out of any
concessions granted (for more details, see
Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, various issues
October 2000–February 2001). In one case, the
USA increased the pressure by commencing
dispute settlement procedures against the
Philippines while negotiations continued. The
difficulty of agreeing delays in implementation
has made developing countries extremely wary
of case-by-case approaches to SDT.
Existing SDT is made up of what developing
countries were able to extract from developed
countries as concessions during the last round of
negotiations. This has not led to a coherent set of
trade policies to support developmental objectives,
but rather to an ad hoc list of provisions. In
particular, much of what developing countries
were promised has turned out to be virtually
worthless because industrialised countries were not
bound by WTO rules to provide it. The objective of
most SDT provisions is to give developing
countries time to develop the administrative
capacity to implement agreements, rather than to
ensure they can implement the trade policy that is
appropriate to their developmental objectives.
Developing countries have been arguing for some
time that SDT provisions need to be reformed.
Before the Doha Ministerial, a number of
developing countries proposed the adoption of a
“Framework Agreement” on SDT, which would set
out a number of principles to guide the application
of SDT across the range ofWTO agreements (WTO
2001a). These aimed to give as much policy
flexibility as possible to developing countries
within allWTO agreements. The proposal was that:
n all futureWTO agreements should be evaluated
in terms of how they contribute to the
achievement of the millennium development
goals;
n the implementation costs of any future
agreement should be assessed and appropriate
financial and technical assistance provided;
n any extended transition periods granted to
developing countries should be linked to
objective economic or social development
criteria;
n developing countries should not be prevented
from implementing any policy unless it is
shown to have an adverse impact on trade;
n developing countries should not necessarily be
bound by the single undertaking.
While this was not agreed at Doha, the ministerial
declaration from that meeting did make specific
reference to the idea of a framework agreement in
the mandate it established for SDT reform in the
WTO (WTO 2001b).
3 What’s happened to special
and differential treatment in the
“development round”?
The Doha Ministerial agreed that there should be
early decisions – by the end of 2002 – on SDT,
intellectual property rights in the area of public
health, and a range of questions relating to
implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements.
Having these three issues in there was part of what
WTO members hoped would make the Doha
negotiations a “development round”. Early
decisions would resolve them before the
negotiations on the “big” issues of agriculture and
services really got going. The idea was that this
would provide a demonstration of commitment by
the industrialised countries toward resolving the
problems of developing country members of the
WTO, and that the issues themselves would be
addressed individually and not be subject to
complex trade-offs.
It was agreed at Doha to review all SDT provisions,
with a view to strengthening them and making
them more ‘precise, effective and operational’
(WTO 2001b). The WTO’s Committee on Trade
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and Development (CTD) was the body charged
with carrying out this mandate in special dedicated
sessions. The task was broken down into six
components:
1. Identification of mandatory and non-
mandatory SDT provisions in existing
agreements.
2. Identification of the non-mandatory provisions
that members consider should be made
mandatory.
3. Consideration of the legal and practical
implications of converting non-mandatory
SDT provisions into mandatory provisions.
4. Examination of ways to make existing SDT
provisions more effective.
5. Consideration of ways to assist developing
countries to make better use of SDT provisions.
6. Consideration of ways SDT provisions may be
incorporated into the architecture of WTO
rules.
CTD members agreed to focus first on existing
provisions. A deadline of 31 July 2002 was set for
making specific recommendations for changes to
make non-mandatory SDT provisions mandatory.
The discussion started inauspiciously, with rows
about who should chair the special CTD sessions.
The Pakistani Ambassador was rejected by
industrialised countries as being too partisan, and
in the end the Ambassador of Jamaica, Ransford
Smith, was appointed chair of the CTD sessions
working on SDT.
In the absence of agreement on any general
principles to guide the process, the CTD was forced
to go through the different SDT provisions one by
one. More than 90 separate proposals for changes
to existing provisions were tabled between
February and July 2002.2 It quickly became clear
that agreeing which of these would be
recommended to the WTO’s General Council
would be a huge task. Countries had very different
understandings of the nature of the exercise in
which the CTD was involved. These, in turn,
illustrated some of the differences of interest
between industrialised and developing countries in
the WTO generally.
Countries disagreed over whether the CTD was
involved in a negotiation, and on the scope of the
discussions. Developing countries tended to argue
that the mandate on SDT was about making good
the results of previous negotiations, rather than
beginning a new set of talks on SDT. They argued
that this did not involve renegotiating existing
agreements, as ‘special and differential treatment
provisions were already negotiated in the adoption
of existing agreements’ (WTO 2002c). As they saw
it, they were engaged in a process of
operationalising what was already agreed, and any
changes to existing agreements that might be
required to achieve this should be seen in that
light. However, industrialised countries preferred
to define the exercise as a negotiating one, where
new agreements were being made, and to argue
that any changes to existing agreements would
effectively involve new negotiations. For this
reason, a number of developed countries (mainly
the European Commission (EC)3 and USA)
challenged the basis of the discussions in the CTD
by arguing that it was not a negotiating body and
therefore could not agree any changes to existing
WTO rules.4 They preferred that anything
presented to the CTD which involved agreements
on which they were already negotiating in other
established bodies should be referred to that body
for discussion. Developing countries argued that
this was unnecessary because agreements on SDT
made in the CTD would not represent the outcome
of new negotiations.
There was also disagreement on the extent to
which the parameters of the review should be set at
the outset. A number of developed countries
(including Switzerland, Japan, Norway and USA)
argued that the ‘objectives and principles’ of SDT
had to be discussed first, before decisions could be
reached on agreement-specific proposals. Although
they had initially supported the idea of agreeing
some criteria for deciding which SDT provisions
should be made mandatory, developing countries
feared that such a discussion would lead to a
narrowing of the focus of the exercise, and
therefore limit the scope of potential gains to be
made. They have therefore opposed this move, and
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preferred to discuss each specific proposal as it was
presented (Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 17
July 2002).
This is not an innocent difference of interpretation
of the Doha mandate. Developing and
industrialised countries have very different
interests in the SDT process, which must be seen in
the context of the whole Doha agenda. For
developing countries, gains were most likely if
early decisions could be made on SDT, before they
were expected to make concessions on other issues
in return. They therefore wanted to push ahead on
issues of substance. For industrialised countries,
much of what was proposed on SDT was not of
great commercial significance, but it was seen
politically as another bargaining chip to be used to
get developing countries to agree other parts of the
Doha agenda. They hoped to delay agreement on
the issues of most significance to developing
countries, but to offer concessions on minor parts
of the agenda to keep developing countries
negotiating.
This difference of strategy became particularly
clear after the 31 July 2002 deadline was missed,
and the CDT attempted to agree a second
deadline for discussions on SDT. A number of
industrialised countries wanted the deadline
extended to the end of March 2003, in order that
decisions on SDT be taken at the same time as
crucial deadlines for the negotiations on
agriculture and on services. Observers argued that
this was a device to get developing countries to
give more ground on agriculture and services as
the price for getting what they wanted on SDT. In
the event, a December 2002 deadline was agreed,
but almost nothing was agreed by that date. De
facto most of the discussions on SDT will now
take place at the same time as other key
negotiations in the WTO.
The lack of movement caused by the failure to
reach any early agreement on issues of SDT
substance is calling into question the sincerity of
the industrialised countries’ intentions at Doha. As
one African delegate said, ‘this absence of progress
on the specific mandate given by ministers in Doha
is not sending the right signals for making the
Doha agenda truly a development one’ (Bridges
Weekly Trade News Digest, 17 July 2002).
4 Special and differential
treatment to Cancún
By December 2002, there was agreement on only
five of the 90-plus proposals that had been tabled.
One was to agree in principle the idea of a
monitoring mechanism for SDT provisions. The
fate of this proposal (WTO 2002c), originally made
by the “Africa group”, illustrates some of the
complexities of the discussions on SDT. In the
context of the many specific proposals for reform,
it looked like a means of strengthening SDT in the
future. However, it has been seized upon by
industrialised country WTO members as an
example of something they can agree which will
give the appearance that progress and concessions
are being made, but at almost no cost to
themselves. Accordingly, developed countries are
now among the most enthusiastic proponents of
the “monitoring mechanism”, while some of the
original proposers of the idea are backtracking,
arguing that the idea is meaningless without some
resolution to the debate on specific proposals. ‘We
may have amonitoring mechanism, but it will have
nothing to monitor’, argues one developing
country delegate.
Of the other four proposals agreed by December
2002, three were for measures in favour of least
developed countries only. One requested simply
that the WTO Secretariat call a meeting for least
developed countries to assist them to identify their
priorities in the negotiations on services. Another
requested industrialised countries to establish
contact points for service suppliers from least
developed countries. The third encouraged
countries to give market access to all exports from
least developed countries. The final one called for
requests for technical assistance to implement the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) to be dealt with favourably,
but was non-mandatory. Unless there is a
substantial change, if developing countries are to
get anything on SDT before the next WTO
ministerial meeting in Cancún in September 2003
it will be worth very little and offered to only the
poorest countries.
It is now inevitable that negotiations on SDT will
become a part of the bargaining that will take place
over the content of agreements on agriculture and
services, and over the decision that will be taken at
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Cancún on whether to launch negotiations on
investment, competition and government
procurement. Hence, the original intention of
ensuring an “early harvest” of decisions on key
development concerns has been lost. While it may
still be possible for developing countries to make
some gains on SDT, this is likely to be at the cost
of making concessions on other things. Given the
complex trade-offs involved in the whole trade
round, there is a danger developing countries will
end up paying a high price for what they do
manage to get on SDT. Any benefits they may
obtain risk being undermined by the
consequences of other agreements. The best
outcome would be agreement on a large
proportion of the most economically significant
proposals made to the CTD, with few concessions
on other issues. The worst is no agreement on SDT
– and significant concessions on other issues. The
most likely may well be only very few decisions on
SDT at Cancún.
Whatever the outcome of Cancún, the first year
of the Doha “development agenda” has illustrated
the importance of an overarching agreement on
SDT in the WTO setting out the principles that
will apply to all of the specific agreements.
Developing countries cannot be expected to pay
over and over again for SDT. They must be sure
that they will always be in a position to interpret
or implement future agreements in ways that
meet their development needs rather than
undermining them. They need some protections
against “bad” agreements. There is no guarantee,
given their weakness in WTO negotiations, that
all future agreements will be development
friendly. It is necessary only to recall the
experience with the TRIPs agreement. At the time
it was heralded as being good for development.
But it is now accepted by many previously
enthusiastic observers as being an agreement,
which is, at the very least, not the best that could
have been achieved for developing countries.
This precedent should make all trade negotiators
humble in asserting that no protections are
needed against the possibility of bad agreements
in the future. As the scope of the WTO continues
to widen, an agreement on SDT that makes clear
the special status of developing countries with
regard to all WTO agreements becomes ever
more necessary.
5 The principles of special and
differential treatment
The debate in theWTO so far has been more about
determining the eventual price to be paid for SDT
than about the content of SDT itself. However, in
the course of these discussions a number of
principles and issues have emerged that may guide
an eventual agreement. Developing countries are
arguing for SDT to take particular forms because it
offers the potential of real commercial benefits to
them. Industrialised countries are wary of changes
that may threaten their economic interests, now or
in the future. These economic interests will, at
some point, be key in determining what kind of
SDT emerges from the negotiations.
Although the proposals made in the CTD so far are
all specific to particular agreements, they give an
indication of general principles for SDT that are
sought by developing countries. Developing
countries want four types of change to SDT:
1. Greater flexibility in their implementation,
interpretation and enforcement of WTO
agreements.
2. Stricter rules for developed countries, to ensure
that developing countries benefit from
increased market access to their markets.
3. The provision of technical assistance sufficient
to implement and benefit from WTO
agreements.
4. Procedures to monitor and enforce SDT.
For developed countries, the main objection to
many of these proposals is their lack of definition
over which countries will benefit. This means they
are reluctant to accept proposals that they would
be willing to offer to less significant trading
partners because they will be equally available to
potential competitors. Hence a fifth element to the
discussion has been over graduation and
differentiation within the developing country
group.
5.1 Flexibility
Many developing countries regard the preservation
of what they consider sufficient flexibility in the
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implementation ofWTO agreements as the priority
for SDT. Current SDT offers temporary exemptions
from WTO agreements on the grounds of
difficulties in implementation. Many observers
agree that this is neither useful economically nor
acceptable politically. Developing countries argue
for exemptions on the grounds of development
needs. They argue that analysis of the strategies
used by successful developers in the past indicates
that a whole range of policy instruments might be
needed in particular cases to promote and support
the domestic private sector in developing
countries.5 Many observers agree that flexibility for
developing countries on the grounds of both
development needs and difficulties in
implementation will be required in any future
overarching SDT agreement. This could take the
form of exemptions for some countries from whole
agreements, or the agreement of different levels of
obligations for countries within agreements. In
either case, the outcome would be that developing
countries had more flexibility than industrialised
countries to use different trade policy instruments
in the areas covered by WTO agreements.
Some negotiators and outside commentators (e.g.
Amsden 2000) have argued that adequate
flexibility already exists withinWTO agreements to
allow developing (and particularly least developed)
countries policy leeway. Developing countries
dispute this. The case cannot be resolved
definitively since very little SDT has been tested in
the dispute settlement system. It may be that while
loopholes do exist in some agreements, the level of
uncertainty created by the possibility of disputes
means that developing countries do not exploit
them. As the scope of WTO agreements increases,
the risk to developing countries of getting their
interpretation of SDT wrong and being taken to the
dispute settlement mechanism also increases. This
is a risk they are becoming unwilling to take.
It is likely that discussion of the justification and
mechanisms for flexibility will continue for some
years. A more nuanced method of agreeing what
flexibility is allowed under WTO agreements is
necessary to ensure both that SDT is useful and
that it is acceptable to industrialised countries. This
requires agreement on the criteria by which some
countries will be exempted from some or all WTO
agreements.
One possibility is to negotiate the rationale and the
limitations of exemptions within each agreement
and in relation to specific provisions within them.
This has been the approach taken so far. The
agreement-specific nature of the work of the CTD
means that discussions have focused on the
developmental benefits of offering some countries
more leeway to use particular policy instruments
such as subsidies. The response of industrialised
countries has generally been to deny the usefulness
of particular instruments, or to object to the
principle of flexibility itself. Industrialised
countries are wary of granting flexibility to large
developing countries to close their potentially
valuable markets. They also cavil at signing blank
cheques for flexibility in future agreements. It is
ironic that industrialised countries have been very
successful in obtaining greater policy flexibility in
areas of interest to them – agriculture and textiles
being two examples that particularly rankle with
developing countries – but are unwilling to grant
the same to others.
The experience in the CTD demonstrates the need
for a binding commitment by allWTO members to
reach agreement on criteria for granting SDT on
developmental grounds within each separate WTO
agreement. Without this, developing countries will
have to argue the case for development exemptions
in each separate agreement, and give away new
concessions each time. The best combination
would be a generalised acceptance of the
importance of flexibility on developmental
grounds, coupled with a binding commitment to
negotiate agreement-specific criteria and
mechanisms. Agreement-specific criteria are
already the basis for the proposal by various
developing countries for a “development box”
granting countries with certain economic and
social characteristics exemptions from provisions
in the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture. This is a
model that could be extended to other areas.
Agreement-specific criteria would be most
appropriate in cases which combine a
developmental justification for flexibility and a need
for the policy instrument used to be closely related
to the particular economic conditions and the
objectives sought. However, where flexibility is
offered on the grounds of difficulties in
implementation there is scope for a more general
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approach. One possibility for dealing with
implementation problems is that total flexibility
should be allowed for developing countries where
this does not cause harm to any other country
(Stevens 2002). If other countries were affected by
non-implementation, it could be made conditional
on receipt of assistance (the implication being that
it would be in the interests of the international
community to provide assistance in this case).
Implementation may also be conditional on
changes to other countries’ trade policies if these are
the source of the problem (e.g. if other countries are
subsidising exports of a particular product and
distorting the market); see Stevens (2002).
An alternative approach has been proposed in
Prowse (2002). Rather than attempting to agree
general principles for resolving the implementation
difficulties of particular countries, more specialised
agencies could be involved in arbitrating. The
suggestion is that developing countries, together
with the range of multilateral agencies involved in
giving policy advice and providing resources,
should individually present to a WTO “panel” a
request for delays in implementation based on the
existing capacity of the country to implement
agreements, the agreed assistance that would be
provided, and the nationally determined trade and
development strategy of the country.
The idea of enlisting other institutions to argue on
behalf of developing countries in the WTO is
attractive if one accepts their bona fides as neutral
development experts. In practice, however, the
likely candidates have been anything but neutral:
they have often demanded as loan conditions that
developing countries give up even more trade
policy flexibility than is necessary to comply with
WTO agreements (Mangeni 2002). It is therefore
difficult to see what they could contribute to SDT,
from a developing country perspective.
Given that other proposals argue for a reversal of
this relationship, it seems highly unlikely that
developing countries would be willing to make SDT
conditional upon support from the Bank and the
Fund. A number of the specific proposals presented
to the CTD are quite explicit that SDT should be
usable by developing countries as a bargaining chip
in discussions on loan conditionalities. There are
proposals for explicit wording requiring other
institutions to respect SDT provisions when setting
loan conditionalities, and one proposal that a WTO
body should review the coherence between WTO
agreements and policy advice offered by other
bodies, with a specific mandate to ensure the
maximum possible policy flexibility and market
access for developing countries.
Whatever approach is taken, the requirement for
greater policy flexibility is likely to be part of the
“bottom line” for developing countries in
negotiations on SDT. Unless they get significant
improvements in this area they are unlikely to sign
up to an agreement on SDT, and would be more
reluctant to agree to other outcomes of the current
trade round.
5.2 Market access
The proposal to build greater flexibility into WTO
rules for developing countries goes together with
an attempt to constrain developed country actions
that affect development. A number of proposals
put forward to the CTD argue that developed
countries should make binding agreements to offer
greater market access to imports from developing
countries. The proposals reflect the concern that as
tariffs are lowered a variety of non-tariff barriers are
being applied, in particular anti-dumping actions,
stringent and changing health and safety standards
and an inflexible application of rules of origin.
The argument that developing countries should
have better access to developed country markets
can hardly be denied in an institution which claims
to be committed to trade liberalisation. In the past,
improving market access for developing countries
has been seen by industrialised countries, and by
many observers, as the key development issue in
trade policy. However, market access on its own is
not sufficient to overcome developing countries’
declining role in international trade. As one
Ghanaian observer (quoted in Christian Aid 2002)
put it, ‘The idea that we have a stockpile of products
simply waiting for better market access is a myth’.
For market access to be effective it must be offered
together with guarantees of sufficient policy
flexibility to allow developing countries to develop
their capacity to export and benefit from larger
markets. In the WTO, the issue is the extent to
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which any improvements in market access for
developing countries must be reciprocal (i.e. must
be accompanied by liberalisation in developing
countries). On the whole, industrialised countries
are willing to offer non-reciprocal market access to
the least developed countries (whose exports are
least likely to challenge domestic suppliers in
industrialised countries), but are less willing to do
so in the case of other developing countries.
Despite these disagreements, the debate has not
become as ideological as the discussions on
flexibility. Calls for more market access are broadly
in line with what developed countries understand
to be the trade liberalising purpose of the WTO.
5.3 Monitoring and enforcement
There is a recognition among all WTO members
that the reason why the negotiations on SDT are
happening is that the past efforts have been
inadequate and ineffective. In part this is because
the provisions themselves have been insufficient.
However, it is also implicit in a number of the
proposals that the WTO has not paid enough
attention to monitoring and enforcing its own
rules. Proposals have been made for improved
systems of monitoring and enforcement. There is
also a suggestion that, in addition to monitoring
the implementation of SDT rules, there should also
be regular monitoring of their effectiveness in
relation to development objectives.
5.4 Technical assistance
Offers of technical assistance are a low-cost
concession that industrialised countries have often
made to developing countries in the WTO.
Although reluctant to adopt binding rules on
technical assistance, there has been a tendency
both within the WTO and among a number of
developed country governments to see technical
assistance as the answer to most developing
country problems. All developing countries also
recognise the importance of appropriate technical
assistance. Yet they have also emphasised in the
negotiations that actual changes in the rules are
required, not just more resources to implement
them. They also emphasise, in the proposals to the
CTD, the need for technical assistance to support
the development of supply side capacity (not
merely compliance with rules) as an essential part
of allowing developing countries to benefit from
WTO agreements.
5.5 Graduation/differentiation
At the moment the category of developing
countries in theWTO is self-selecting. In principle,
any country that wishes can call itself developing
and benefit from most SDT provisions. There are
exceptions: some elements of SDT apply only to
the United Nations category of least developed
countries, and a few SDT provisions also
differentiate between countries and offer the
possibility of graduation. For example, countries
with a per capita income of under US$1,000 per
year are exempt from the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures.
The question of which countries might be eligible
for SDT in the future is one of the main stumbling
blocks in the current debate on SDT. On the one
hand, developing countries are anxious not to
enter into potentially divisive discussions on
differentiation between themselves. On the other,
industrialised countries are reluctant to sign up to
SDT which could confer significant benefits upon
countries such as India or Brazil, which are major
traders and whose companies could provide
serious competition.
Towards the end of 2002, the EC attempted to raise
this issue through an informal paper. This was
supported by most industrialised countries. It
argued that without some agreement on
differentiation, and the possibility of graduation
out of SDT as a country develops, no substantial
concessions would be forthcoming from
industrialised countries. Developing countries
argued that without some evidence of good
intentions by industrialised countries they were not
prepared even to consider the issue (Bridges Weekly
Trade News Digest, 14 November 2002).
The debate is at a stalemate: industrialised
countries are not prepared to offer anything
significant on SDT until they are confident it will
apply only to a specified group of countries, while
developing countries are prepared to negotiate on
differentiation only once they are offered
something significant enough on SDT to make it
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worth the potential problems it may cause. Most
developing country delegates admit in private that
it is an issue that will have to be addressed at some
point. Some proposals, such as the pre-Doha
proposal for a framework agreement on SDT which
suggested objective criteria to determine the
duration of SDT, implicitly endorse the idea of
differentiation between developing countries and
the possibility of graduation.
The problem is not going to go away, whatever
form the discussions on SDT eventually take. Any
solution is likely to involve a move away from the
current classification of countries into just three
categories: least developed, developing or
industrialised. A shift to a more flexible system of
classification might allay some of the fears of
industrialised countries about offering open-ended
concessions, yet result in sufficient benefits for
enough developing countries to obtain their
agreement. Two possibilities for greater flexibility
involve agreeing different classifications of
countries for each agreement, or agreeing SDT on a
country-by-country basis.
Using different criteria for granting policy
flexibility within each agreement would offer more
scope to design SDT that deals effectively with the
actual problems that developing countries face in
specific areas. A corollary, though, is that it would
require the creation of a number of different
groupings of countries entitled to take advantage of
SDT measures, depending on their particular
economic structure and the relevance of the
agreement in question. Almost all developing
countries would be likely to get something, though
not necessarily in every agreement. This would
reduce the problem of divisions being created
between developing countries. Though likely to be
time consuming, this process could be assisted if
general agreements on the rationale and purpose of
SDT were made to guide the development of
agreement-specific criteria for SDT.
For some observers, the difficulty of agreeing criteria
for differentiating between countries is so great that
the attempt should be abandoned altogether (Prowse
2002). Instead, each country would negotiate its SDT
provisions separately, which might result in the
development, over time, of implicit criteria for
making decisions on SDT based on past practice.
Such country-by-country negotiations on SDT
might be the logical conclusion of accepting that
countries have different trade policy needs
depending on their level of development, but in the
WTO context it is likely to prove both inefficient
and unfair. WTO processes tend to be very slow.
The difficulty of agreeing delays to implementation
on a case by case basis for particular agreements
has been discussed above. The accessions process,
provides another example of the dangers of a case-
by-case approach. Countries seeking membership
of the WTO negotiate individually on how and
when they will implement existing agreements.
This process is particularly unsuited to the needs of
the poorest countries – not one least developed
country has joined the WTO since 1995, and only
one (Vanuatu) has begun formal proceedings with
the holding of a Working Party meeting on
accession (UNCTAD 2001).
For each developing country, negotiating individually
is likely to lead to a worse outcome than negotiating
together: weak delegations will be confronted by
more powerful and better-resourced trading partners,
without any externally agreed criteria to underpin
their case. Again, this has been the experience of
many of the countries attempting to accede to the
WTO. Vanuatu, for example, was asked to forego
some of the SDT benefits available to it, as a least
developed country, and to join a number of WTO
agreements that are optional (such as the Agreement
on Government Procurement which, as Fenster (this
volume) shows, has very limited developing country
participation, probably rightly so). Even negotiating
as a group, developing countries are weak in the
WTO and it is unlikely that they will get better
outcomes by negotiating separately.
6 After Cancún: the way forward
The discussion on procedural issues and
agreement-specific proposals has dominated the
first year of discussions in the WTO on SDT and is
likely to be the main focus up to the Cancún
ministerial in 2003. However, the Doha mandate
also requires WTO members to consider ways SDT
provisions might be incorporated into the
architecture of WTO agreements. It makes specific
reference to a “framework agreement”, which was
prepared by a group of developing countries before
Doha (WTO 2001b). This aims to set out general
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principles guiding the design and implementation
of SDT measures in each specific WTO agreement.
It is a crucial part of renegotiating SDT in theWTO
– and although there are good political reasons
why it has not featured so far in the discussions, it
is essential for developing countries that it is
considered seriously at some point.
A more flexible approach, recognising that
developing countries’ trade policies may differ
depending on their level of development, would
focus attention on the impact of WTO agreements
in meeting specific objectives, rather than, as now,
on the extent of implementation for its own sake.
The institutionalisation of a system to review WTO
agreements against development criteria would
imply a shift away from the assumption that trade
liberalisation is the most desirable trade policy
towards an approach more closely based on real
experience and individual country needs. This is in
line with developments in other institutions, such
as the World Bank, where demands for structural
adjustment programmes based on a set of universal
assumptions have been changed to the
(theoretically) more flexible and country-specific
approach to loan conditionalities embodied in the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process.
Some observers have raised the possibility that
giving a large number of developing countries
permanent exemptions from WTO agreements
could mean that all trade deals become effectively
plurilateral, and that developing countries cease to
commit any resources to trying to get good
agreements (from their point of view) in the WTO.
However, a failure to give developing countries any
guarantees of special treatment in the WTO will
lead to their effective exclusion from agreements as
they fail to implement them, withdraw from the
WTO system altogether as the costs mount up, or
simply block any further development of the WTO
rule book. It is in everyone’s interest to ensure that
none of these scenarios becomes a reality and
therefore to come to some mutually satisfactory
agreement regularising the negotiating relationship
between industrialised and developing countries.
7 Conclusion
The story of the first year of the Doha negotiating
agenda has not covered the WTO with glory.
Procedural tricks, a lack of willingness to discuss
key issues, the breakdown of trust between
delegations and the extremely slow pace of
discussions have all shown how much work
remains to put development into the “development
round”.
The negotiations on SDT have both a practical and
a symbolic value. Some of the provisions under
discussion, and the principles that are hidden in
the proposals for specific changes, would be of real
economic significance to developing countries as
they try to participate in the international trading
system in a way that reduces poverty rather than
exacerbating it. SDT has also become something of
a test of the seriousness of industrialised countries’
intentions. Without some agreement, developing
countries are unlikely to be in a mood to make
concessions in other areas.
The story of WTO agreements up to now has been
one of developing countries bowing to the agenda
of the industrialised powers. If that happens again
in the Doha Round – and in particular if it happens
on issues as central to developing countries’
concerns as SDT – they will be entirely justified in
walking away from the WTO altogether. It is the
responsibility of the industrialised countries to
make sure that this does not happen.
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Notes
1. This information comes from three documents
prepared by the WTO Secretariat: WTO (2001c,
2002a, 2002b).
2. Twelve separate documents were submitted to the
special session of the CTD before the end of July 2002.
Most contained a number of specific requests for
changes in existing SDT provisions, which together
added up to more than 90 separate changes. Of the 12
documents, nine were from developing countries or
groups of developing and least developed countries,
the European Commission (EC) and USA submitted
one each, and one was submitted by Hungary. All are
available on the WTO’s document search facility,
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp.
3. The EC negotiates in the WTO on behalf of all
member states of the EU. Negotiating positions in
the WTO are influenced by a range of international
political forces. Towards the end of 2002, as the
crucial European Heads of State meeting loomed, at
which key decisions were to be taken on
enlargement, a number of the countries hoping to
gain entry to the EU became very vocal in supporting
the EC’s position in the negotiations on SDT.
4. This involved almost farcical tactics: the EC, for
example, was reported to have spent a large part of
the early meetings of the CTD special sessions
arguing that the notation on the documents issued by
the CTD should not contain the abbreviation ‘TN’
(for trade negotiations), since this denoted that it was
a negotiating body and the EC argued that it was not.
5. For a fuller discussion of the evidence, see Melamed
(2002).
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